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COLLECT CALL FOR CLARIFICATION: 
HOW CARPENTER HAS (AND HAS NOT) 
CHANGED MODERN FOURTH 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Abstract: Since the 1800s, the United States Supreme Court has struggled to de-
fine the limits of the Fourth Amendment and adapt the scope of its protection to 
advances in technology. The new ways we use technology to interact, and the 
role such technology plays in society, create unique questions that judicial prece-
dent based on old technology has trouble answering. Most recently, cell phones 
and mobile applications have changed the way millions of Americans communi-
cate with each other, and access and store information. For years the government 
accessed this shared information through subpoenas without triggering the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection from unwarranted searches and seizures. This was justi-
fied under the third-party doctrine—when an individual shares information with 
a third party they lose their expectation of privacy to it, and, thus, Fourth 
Amendment protection. In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court quali-
fied this analysis, and held that despite the information being shared with a third 
party, an individual maintains an expectation of privacy to their cell site location 
information, a pervasive and historical record of personal whereabouts derived 
from cell phone communication with cell towers. The Supreme Court’s narrow 
decision leaves questions about what other types of data may be protected. This 
Note argues that the implicit logic found in the history of the Fourth Amendment 
and its jurisprudence suggests that the Fourth Amendment will continue to pro-
tect pervasive means for exercising other rights secured in the Constitution. 
INTRODUCTION 
As you read this, the cell phone in your purse or pocket is continuously 
communicating with nearby cell towers, sharing data and identifying its loca-
tion.1 As frequently as every seven seconds, this cell site location information 
(“CSLI”) is updated.2 CSLI from a single tower contains sufficient data to ac-
curately pinpoint your location within 200 feet, and CSLI from multiple towers 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Eric Lode, Annotation, Validity of Use of Cellular Telephone or Tower to Track Prospec-
tive, Real Time, or Historical Position of Possessor of Phone Under Fourth Amendment, 92 A.L.R. 
FED. 2d 1, § 2 (2015) (collecting and discussing state court cases regarding the application and validi-
ty of Fourth Amendment protection to cellular phone location information shared with cell towers). 
 2 See Commonwealth v. Princiotta, No. 2009-0965, 2013 WL 1363901, at *2 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 
Apr. 1, 2013) (noting that registration with cell towers occurs roughly every seven seconds); Lode, 
supra note 1, § 2 (citing State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 568 (2013)) (noting the frequency with which 
cell phones communicate with cell towers). 
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can be triangulated to determine an even more precise location.3 Determining 
whether the Fourth Amendment protects this information from unwarranted 
searches and seizures is the latest chapter in the quest to unearth what exactly 
the Fourth Amendment protects and why.4 
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens’ rights “to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” 
and provides that “no Warrants shall [be] issue[d], but upon probable cause . . . 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”5 The language makes it clear that persons, papers, and homes are pro-
tected, but the United States Supreme Court has continued to expand the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection while struggling to coherently explain its rea-
sons for doing so.6 The owner of the various types of property enumerated in 
the Fourth Amendment has protection against their search and seizure, but the 
Justices of the Court still dispute whether property rights or privacy drive the 
Fourth Amendment.7 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Lode, supra note 1, § 2. This phenomenon exists because the demand for services necessitates 
having multiple towers to service customers. See id. As the phone communicates with more than one 
tower at once, more than one relative location is recorded. See id. (discussing the accuracy of location 
information through CSLI and triangulating location with more than one CSLI). 
 4 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (declining to extend the 
third-party doctrine to cover CSLI and holding that the disclosure of this information to third-parties 
“does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection”); United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (developing the third-party doctrine: one who conveys information, 
even if only for a limited purpose, to a third party assumes the risk that the third party will convey the 
information to the police); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(articulating the reasonable expectation of privacy test); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886) (holding that to protect the individual’s right from self-incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment the papers had to be protected under the Fourth Amendment from warrantless search and sei-
zure). See generally Lode, supra note 1 (collecting and discussing state court cases regarding the ap-
plication and validity of Fourth Amendment protection to cellular phone location information shared 
with cell towers). This Note takes a descriptive approach, analyzing the Fourth Amendment’s history 
and precedent to identify a unifying logic illustrated in the Carpenter decision. 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 6 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., 
concurring); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
 7 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of the employ-
ment of a positive law approach to the Fourth Amendment and discussing what its application to CSLI 
might look like); William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1827–29 (2016) (developing a model of positive law anchors to 
Fourth Amendment protection based on legal rights recognized under other substantive areas of law 
such as property and torts); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
561, 570–73 (2009) (defending the third-party doctrine but collecting and discussing the doctrinal and 
functional critiques of the doctrine found in both scholarship and dissenting opinions by Supreme 
Court justices); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1528–29 
(2010) (“The Fourth Amendment should regulate government information gathering whenever it 
causes problems of reasonable significance. Government information gathering often poses significant 
problems affecting freedom and democracy. Government information gathering activities can invade 
privacy and inhibit freedom of speech and association.”) (arguing that the significance of the problems 
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In the late 1960s, the United States Supreme Court formally adopted the 
rationale that a reasonable expectation of privacy, and not solely property 
rights, triggered Fourth Amendment protection.8 In Katz v. United States, the 
Court articulated a two-prong test requiring: (1) a subjective expectation of 
privacy by the individual; and (2) that the expectation of privacy be one that 
society is willing to accept as reasonable.9 This second objective prong has 
proved hard to employ, given what many scholars have identified as a circular-
ity in the logic of what society is willing to accept as reasonable.10 Before the 
Court clarified how to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test, it in-
troduced the third-party doctrine—by sharing information with a third party, 
the individual assumes the risk that the recipient may share that information 
with the government and, thus, the individual loses their expectation of priva-
cy.11 Instead of analyzing what made an expectation of privacy society was 
willing to recognize as reasonable, the Court shifted its focus to the more nar-
row question of whether the information was shared.12 Meanwhile, advances in 
                                                                                                                           
caused by the surveillance should determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment in place of the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy standard). As Baude and Stern discuss in their article, Justice Scalia 
repeatedly used positive law rights to supplement the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Baude & 
Stern, supra, at 1827 n.21 (citing Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 308 (2014) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (stressing that the reasonable expectation of privacy test was added as a supplement to, not a 
substitute for, the property understanding of the Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 
11 (2013) (same); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407–08 (2012) (same); Georgia v. Randolph, 
547 U.S. 103, 143–44 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that changes in property law affect 
changes in Fourth Amendment application)). 
 8 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating the two-prong reasonable 
expectation of privacy test despite the majority not providing a test for its holding). The subjective 
prong of the test requires that the individual subjectively believe he has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and the objective prong requires that the expectation of privacy be one that society is willing 
to recognize. Id. Harlan, when laying out the test in his concurrence, fails to explain the criteria for 
when an expectation of privacy satisfies the second prong of the test. Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See JEFFERY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 60 
(2001) (“Harlan’s test was applauded as a victory for privacy, but it soon became clear that it was 
entirely circular.”); Baude & Stern, supra note 7, at 1825 (noting the circularity of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitu-
tional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 808–09 n.23 (2004) (noting that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test is circular because there is only a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when the courts decide that that expectation should be protected) (citing Michael 
Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60–61 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, moreover, is circular, for someone can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if 
and only if the Court has held that a search in that area would be unreasonable.”)). This Note suggests 
that one way to solve the circularity of Justice Harlan’s test is by grounding the objective prong in the 
premise that the Fourth Amendment protects the pervasive means through which citizens exercise 
their other constitutionally secured rights, an implicit logic in many of the Supreme Court’s decisions. 
See infra Part III. 
 11 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 12 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43 (holding that a customer at a bank does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to the information he shared to a third party). 
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technology continued to assume new roles in society and change the way 
members of society interacted with each other, challenging the Court’s own 
notion that sharing information put Fourth Amendment protection out of 
reach.13 
Most recently, in 2018, the Supreme Court reinterpreted these doctrines in 
Carpenter v. United States to determine what protection the Fourth Amend-
ment provides to an individual’s historical CSLI.14 Carpenter’s majority and 
dissents frame their arguments along the two principal schools of Fourth 
Amendment thinking.15 The majority supported its decision using the reasona-
ble expectation of privacy test adopted in the late 1960s, and held, for the first 
time, that a person maintained an expectation of privacy society was willing to 
recognize even after they shared that information with a third party.16 The dis-
                                                                                                                           
 13 See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (noting the prevalence of cell phones in society and 
holding that historical CSLI warranted Fourth Amendment protection); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473, 2488–89 (2014) (noting the unique nature of the data stored on cell phones in society and hold-
ing that police officers could not search the content of cell phones on arrest without a warrant); Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) (using noninvasive technology to collect information 
otherwise not made readily available to the public infringes upon Fourth Amendment protection from 
warrantless searches and seizures); Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the prev-
alence of telephones in society and holding that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when they enter a telephone booth, shut the door behind them, and communicate through the tele-
phone). 
 14 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 15 See id. at 2217–21, 2235, 2257, 2272 (applying the majority’s reasonable expectation of priva-
cy test and applying the dissent’s property concepts). Compare Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (articulating the reasonable expectation of privacy test and its two prongs: (1) subjective 
belief that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) willingness of society to accept that 
expectation of privacy as reasonable), with Baude & Stern, supra note 7, at 1827 n.21 (citing Fernan-
dez, 571 U.S. at 308 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stressing that the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
was added as a supplement to, not a substitute for the property understanding of the Fourth Amend-
ment); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11 (same); Jones, 565 U.S. at 407–08 (same); Randolph, 547 U.S. at 
143–45 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that changes in property law affect changes in Fourth 
Amendment application). 
 16 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17, 2220–21. The Court declined to extend the third-party doc-
trine to CSLI, holding that the disclosure of this information to third-parties “does not by itself over-
come the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at 2217. Individuals maintain an expecta-
tion of privacy towards the CSLI tracking their movement and, therefore, government-compelled 
disclosure of the location information under the Stored Communications Act constitutes a search. Id. 
at 2221. The Act provides that when law enforcement officials “‘offer[] specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the records sought ‘are relevant and materi-
al to an ongoing criminal investigation,’” the government may compel disclosure of information under 
the jurisdiction of the Act. Id. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018)). The resultant discrepan-
cy between the probable cause standard and the standard enumerated in the Act was rectified by the 
Court in Carpenter by requiring the government to have probable cause to compel disclosure. See id. 
at 2221; Lode, supra note 1, § 2 (noting that the standard for disclosure under the Stored Communica-
tions Act is lower than the standard applied for probable cause). The standard for probable cause 
“usually requires ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion.’” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (quoting 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61 (1976)) (noting that unlike the general stand-
ard, the Fourth Amendment does not have one “irreducible” standard when it comes to warrants, but 
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sents refuted protection of CSLI and, instead, advocated for a property-based 
conception of the Fourth Amendment that has fallen in and out of practice 
throughout its jurisprudence.17 
In Carpenter’s wake, it is clear that historical CSLI is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment and that society is willing to recognize an expectation of 
privacy in historical CSLI as reasonable, despite the fact that it is shared with a 
third party.18 The Supreme Court, however, was equally clear that Carpenter 
was a narrow ruling.19 As a result, it is unclear how Carpenter’s adjustments to 
Fourth Amendment analysis will extend to other aspects of modern life on the 
Internet.20 As Justice Gorsuch notes in his dissent, much of our lives are now 
online and companies are both keeping records for us and keeping records 
about us.21 Our private papers, once kept locked away, are now held on servers 
                                                                                                                           
rather the protection differs with the reasonable expectation of privacy associated with the area subject 
to the warrant). The Stored Communications Act, however, essentially required law enforcement 
officials to show that the requested information might be pertinent to their ongoing investigation, a 
discrepancy that the Court emphasized was “gigantic.” Id. The Carpenter Court recharacterized the 
breadth of the third-party doctrine, reasoning that although disclosure to a third party diminishes the 
expectation of privacy when an individual shares the information, the diminished expectation does not 
necessarily put the Fourth Amendment out of reach. Id. at 2219 (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485, 2488 
(2014) (holding that police officers could not search the content of cell phones on arrest without a 
warrant)).  
 17 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“This case should be resolved by 
interpreting accepted property principles as the baseline for reasonable expectations of privacy.”); id. 
at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[This case] should turn . . . on whose property was searched . . . . 
By obtaining the cell-site records of MetroPCS and Sprint, the government did not search Carpenter’s 
property. He did not create the records . . . [or] maintain them, he cannot control them . . . [or] destroy 
them.”); id. at 2257 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he cell-site records obtained by the Government belong 
to Carpenter’s cell service providers, not to Carpenter . . . . Carpenter . . . has no meaningful control 
over the cell-site records, which are created, maintained, altered, used, and eventually destroyed by his 
cell service providers.”); id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that Carpenter had some prop-
erty rights to his CSLI under the Stored Communications Act but that this argument was not made and 
thus the case could not be resolved on these grounds). 
 18 Id. at 2212, 2216–17 (majority opinion). 
 19 See id. at 2220. The Court said that their holding did not apply to real-time CSLI or “tower 
dumps.” Id. Tower dumps are the “download of information on all the devices that connected to a 
particular cell site during a particular interval.” Id. The Court also made it clear that its decision did 
not disturb the application of an unqualified third-party doctrine in other contexts, that it did not dis-
turb the jurisprudence of conventional surveillance techniques and tools, and that it did not mean to 
address other business records covered by the third-party doctrine that might incidentally reveal loca-
tion information. Id. 
 20 See id. (noting that the Court’s decision was narrow to the facts before it regarding historical 
CSLI). 
 21 Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Although dissenting, Justice Gorsuch agreed with protect-
ing the CSLI—however, he dissented in order to advocate an approach through arguments that were 
not preserved. Id. at 2272. 
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for our convenience.22 With this shift comes the need for Fourth Amendment 
protection suited for modern society.23 
Analyzing the history of the Fourth Amendment and its precedent reveals 
an implicit logic to the Amendment, and the Supreme Court reemphasized this 
logic in Carpenter.24 The Fourth Amendment protects more than just the in-
struments enumerated in the Amendment’s language—it protects the means 
used for exercising other constitutionally secured rights.25 Not only does this 
logic help to explain the Fourth Amendment’s strained history, but it also 
grounds the objective prong of the Katz test.26 This logic also informs us how 
Carpenter’s qualification of the third-party doctrine may be extended to other 
advances in technology.27 
Part I of this Note discusses the historical context within which the Fram-
ers adopted the Fourth Amendment and tracks the Fourth Amendment’s judi-
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. at 2262. 
 23 Id. (arguing that given how much of our lives are shared on the Internet there is an open ques-
tion regarding what is left of the Fourth Amendment under the third-party doctrine). 
 24 See id. at 2219, 2221 (majority opinion) (noting the prevalence and variety of cell phone use 
and reasoning that although CSLI is not personal papers, the information from CSLI is so pervasive 
and revealing that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is lessened but not destroyed 
when shared with a third party); Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that 
unlike in the past where information gathered was limited and thus painted a limited picture of the life 
monitored, the volume of easily accessible data can paint a picture of an individual’s religious, politi-
cal, and personal identity, creating a potentially chilling effect on the rights of expression and associa-
tion and that such effect on the exercise of rights must be considered in any balance); Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the increasing prevalence of using 
phones in the late 1970s and warning of the potential impediments that warrantless government sur-
veillance could have on First Amendment freedoms, such as political associations and the press). 
 25 See Melody J. Brannon, Carpenter v. United States: Building a Property-Based Fourth 
Amendment Approach for Digital Data, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2019, at 20, 22–23 (noting that the Car-
penter majority, which included Justice Sotomayor, seemed to embrace the position of Justice So-
tomayor’s concurrence in Jones, which held that the pervasiveness of digital communication makes 
the third-party doctrine “ill suited” and warned of its chilling effects) (emphasis in original omitted) 
(citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)); H. Brian Holland, A Cognitive Theory of 
the Third-Party Doctrine and Digital Papers, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 60, 95–96 (2018) (accepting that 
only persons, houses, papers, and effects are covered by the Fourth Amendment and arguing that 
papers are a special subclass protected by the Fourth Amendment because they are “cognitive arti-
facts” of the “freedom of thought” protected by the Constitution). Holland argues that unchecked 
application of the third-party doctrine to all digital media has a chilling effect on rights enjoyed under 
the Constitution. Holland, supra, at 95. 
 26 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–19 (analyzing the nature of the information, and how perva-
sively identifying it is before determining whether the third-party doctrine diminished or extinguished 
the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy); Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(articulating the reasonable expectation of privacy test but not explaining what warrants the willing-
ness of society to accept an expectation of privacy as reasonable). 
 27 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (noting the prevalence of cell phone use and reasoning that 
although CSLI is not personal papers, the information from CSLI is so pervasive and revealing that an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is lessened but not destroyed when CSLI is shared with 
a third party). 
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cial interpretation over time.28 Part II discusses the Carpenter decision and 
focuses on the approaches taken by each of the dissents.29 Part III analyzes the 
implicit logic of the Fourth Amendment and how it is expressed in Carpen-
ter.30 
I. WHERE DID THE FOURTH AMENDMENT COME FROM? 
The Framers considered it essential to provide protection against the 
“general warrants” and “writs of assistance” employed by the British Crown 
during the colonial era.31 Too fresh were the memories of these arbitrary, unre-
strained invasions into the home, and patriots rallied around the condemnation 
of the practices.32 Informed by state constitutions adopted in the early republic, 
the language of the Fourth Amendment reflects colonial attitudes towards three 
cases of the 1760s.33 The first two cases, Entick v. Carrington and Wilkes v. 
Wood, took place in England and concerned the authors of political writings 
that angered the British Crown.34 In Entick, agents of the Crown executed gen-
eral warrants issued by the British secretary of state for the seizure of the de-
fendant, along with his books and papers.35 In Wilkes, the warrant charged 
agents to search and seize any “authors, printers and publishers” of the “sedi-
tious paper” at issue.36 Lord Camden ruled in favor of both defendants; his de-
cisions stand for the proposition that cause is necessary for searches, seizures, 
and arrests to be valid.37 Moreover, the reasoning in Entick emphasized the 
“importance of the private interest in homes and papers.”38 Lord Camden de-
scribed the papers, which were the means for communication in that day, as the 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 31–115 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 116–177 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 178–231 and accompanying text. 
 31 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (discussing the history preceding the Fourth Amendment). 
 32 Id. (quoting 10 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 248 (1856)). 
 33 See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 
396–97 (1995) (discussing the context during which the Fourth Amendment was adopted and its early 
history thereafter); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).  
 34 See Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1029, 1029–31, 1066–67, (C.P. 1765) (original at 
Harvard University) (standing for the principle that cause is needed for search and seizure); Wilkes v. 
Wood, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1153, 1169–70 (C.P. 1763) (original at Harvard University) (standing for 
the proposition that cause is necessary for such searches, seizures, and arrests to be valid); see also 
Stuntz, supra note 33, at 397 (noting Entick as an influential case during the framing of the U.S. Con-
stitution). 
 35 Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1029–31; Stuntz, supra note 33, at 397. 
 36 Wilkes, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1163, 1169–70. 
 37 Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1066–67; Wilkes, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1163, 1169–70; Stuntz, 
supra note 33, at 400. 
 38 Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1066; Stuntz, supra note 33, at 399. 
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“dearest property” with a “secret nature.”39 Although the defendant had proper-
ty rights to his papers, Lord Camden reasoned that the privacy interest in this 
“dearest property” aggravates the circumstances of the initial trespass.40 Thus, 
the private interest appears at once rooted in and independent from the rights 
of property.41 
The third case, the Boston Writs of Assistance Case, took place in the 
Colonies but did not result in the same protection as Entick and Wilkes.42 The 
Acts of Frauds, passed in 1662 and 1696, allowed customs officers to break 
into and seize any prohibited or uncustomed goods or merchandise without 
cause.43 Merchants in Boston challenged the Acts as invalid because the writs 
authorized the unchecked discretion of customs agents to infringe on the privi-
lege of privacy in the home.44 Although the writs were upheld, the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause requirement reflects the position that unchecked 
discretion to infringe on the privilege of privacy is unacceptable.45 
Section A of this Part discusses the United States Supreme Court’s pre-
Katz approach to interpreting the Fourth Amendment.46 Section B presents the 
approach taken by the United States Supreme Court after Katz.47 
A. How We Used to Apply the Fourth Amendment 
Confusion regarding the purpose and breadth of the Fourth Amendment 
began early in its jurisprudence.48 In 1878, in Ex parte Jackson, the United 
States Supreme Court held that letters and other sealed packages in the mail 
are “guarded from examination and inspection.”49 Echoing the language of 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1066. 
 40 See id. at 1066–67 (standing for the principle that cause is needed for search and seizure); 
Stuntz, supra note 33, at 399–400 (tracing the privacy and property themes throughout the Entick and 
Wilkes decisions). 
 41 See Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1066 (noting that the privacy interest at stake aggravated the 
harm of the offense); Stuntz, supra note 33, at 419 (“To put it differently, privacy protection always 
limits the government’s substantive power, and if that limit was not the prime reason for these re-
strictions on criminal law enforcement, it was at least a happy byproduct.”) (footnote omitted).  
 42 Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1066–67; Wilkes, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1169–70; Stuntz, supra 
note 33, at 406. 
 43 Stuntz, supra note 33, at 406 (quoting Acts of Frauds § 5(2) (1662)). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 404–06. 
 46 See infra notes 48–70 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 71–115 and accompanying text. 
 48 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (merging the analysis of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Ex 
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (holding that Congress’s duty to facilitate the postal service 
did not deny protection under the Fourth Amendment); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 788 (1994) (noting the merging of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments analysis in Boyd). 
 49 Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733. The only permissible inspection absent a warrant was outwardly ap-
parent observations, such as the letter’s or package’s weight and shape. Id. 
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Entick, the Supreme Court made clear that individuals’ right to be free from 
unwarranted searches and seizures extended to their papers, wherever they 
were.50 Thus, the powers vested in Congress to create and facilitate a mail sys-
tem did not extinguish the rights of individuals protected in the Fourth 
Amendment.51 
In 1886, the Supreme Court reinforced the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tion of an individual’s papers in Boyd v. United States.52 The Court held uncon-
stitutional a statute that authorized the use of subpoenas to order the produc-
tion of invoices for use in an action against the defendant.53 The Court found 
this to be equivalent to compelling production of the papers and thus function-
ally the same as a warrantless search and seizure because it “effects the sole 
object and purpose of search and seizure.”54 The Court did not stop here, how-
ever, and went on to merge the analysis of production of documents under the 
Fourth Amendment with the Fifth Amendment’s protection from self-
incrimination.55 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment protected the pa-
pers because if it did not, and the defendant had to turn over the papers, then 
the defendant could not exercise his Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination.56 After quoting Lord Camden’s decision in Entick, the Court 
concluded that property rights were not the only rights infringed during a 
search and seizure.57 Rather, “the essence of the offence” was the invasion of a 
privacy interest—infringement on the “privacies of life” by “arbitrary pow-
er.”58 Thus, the analysis in Boyd hinged more on the privacy interest at stake 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id.; see Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1066–67. 
 51 Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733–37. This protection prevailed regardless of the reality that people gave 
their property to the government for the property to be delivered elsewhere. Id. at 733. Justice Gor-
such, in his dissent in Carpenter, noted that Jackson suggests a “constitutional floor” for the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2270–71 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also 
Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (ruling that the subordination of Congress’s postal power to the Fourth 
Amendment prevented the mailer’s rights to their mailed property from being infringed upon via 
search and seizure). In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch argued that this mail carrier relationship is a bail-
ment and emphasizes the strength of the property interests protected when the bailment to the gov-
ernment in Jackson did not diminish the constitutional guarantees to be free from search and seizure. 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2269–71 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 52 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (protecting papers under the Fourth Amendment that could have 
been self-incriminating under the Fifth Amendment). 
 53 Id. at 617–20, 622. Under the statute, if the defendant did not produce the subpoenaed docu-
ments, it would be presumed that he confessed to the allegations. Id. at 621. 
 54 Id. at 621–22. 
 55 Id. at 630; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (securing, in relevant part, prohibition against self-
incrimination). 
 56 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 57 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; see also Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1029–31, 1066–67. 
 58 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
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and the protection of other constitutional rights than the property interests the 
individual had in the items.59 
Conversely, in 1927, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court be-
gan to move away from this privacy interest as the guiding principle for Fourth 
Amendment protection.60 In Olmstead, law enforcement officials wiretapped 
the defendant’s residence and office phonelines without trespassing on his 
property.61 The Court limited Fourth Amendment protection to material objects 
and held that absent any trespass of the defendant’s property, the conduct of the 
agents did not amount to a search and seizure.62 Fourth Amendment protection 
did not extend to “wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant’s 
house or office,” despite those wires carrying the defendant’s private conversa-
tions.63 
Similarly, in 1942, in Goldman v. United States, the Supreme Court held 
that the use of a listening device in an adjacent room to eavesdrop on a tele-
phone conversation held in the privacy of one’s office was not a search and 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.64 The agents did not trespass on the de-
fendant’s property, and therefore the Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
did not apply—and the privacy interest so important to Lord Camden in Entick 
and emphasized in Boyd was not a factor in the Court’s analysis.65 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See id. at 628–30 (stressing the privacy interest at stake and quoting Lord Camden’s decision in 
Entick); see also Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1066 (discussing the privacy interest infringed upon 
when there is an unwarranted search and seizure). Although the Court noted that this was an “invasion 
of [Boyd’s] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property,” it empha-
sized the infringement of Boyd’s privacy interest and not his property rights as the “essence of the 
offense.” Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
 60 Compare Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (emphasizing both privacy and property interests at the heart 
of the Fourth Amendment), with Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (using property 
concepts, not privacy rights, as the logic behind the Fourth Amendment), overruled in part by Katz, 
389 U.S. at 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (using privacy interest infringement as the anchor 
of the Fourth Amendment). 
 61 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457. The law enforcement officers avoided trespassing on the defend-
ant’s property by making the office wiretap in the basement of the building and the residential wire-
taps on the streets adjacent to the defendant’s residence. Id. 
 62 Id. at 466. The Court in Olmstead declined to analogize the relationship between the phone 
company and the government as a mail carrier. Id. at 464. The Court focused on the monopoly held by 
the government over mail delivery and the fact that the letters were sealed. Id. 
 63 Id. at 465. 
 64 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942), overruled in part by Katz, 389 U.S. at 
360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). The apparatus that allowed law enforcement agents to listen to 
Goldman’s conversation was pressed against the wall of an adjoining office. Id. 
 65 Id. at 134–35; see also Boyd, 116 U.S. at 628–30 (stressing the privacy interest at stake and 
quoting Lord Camden’s decision in Entick); Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1066 (discussing the priva-
cy interest infringed upon when there is an unwarranted search and seizure). This absence did not go 
unnoticed, however, and as Justice Murphy noted in his dissent, the privacy interest emphasized as a 
principal concern in the Entick and Boyd cases provides the Fourth Amendment the ability to accom-
modate individuals’ protections against modern technology that no longer required entry to search a 
home and seize information. See Goldman, 316 U.S. at 137 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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The absence of a trespass onto the individual’s property continued to be a 
barrier to Fourth Amendment protection until the 1960s.66 In 1961, the Su-
preme Court held in Silverman v. United States that technical trespass under 
local law need not be established for the Fourth Amendment’s protection to 
prohibit the recording of oral statements.67 Law enforcement officials used a 
device concealed in a heating duct in the defendant’s apartment to overhear 
conversations, and the government argued its permissibility on the technicality 
of whether a trespass had occurred.68 The Court did not rest its decision on the 
law of trespass; rather, it held that government agents intruded into a “constitu-
tionally protected area,” absent any further explanation besides suggesting that 
a house is always one such area.69 Thus, as the foregoing demonstrates, from 
the 1880s through the early 1960s, it remained unclear whether property inter-
ests or privacy interests triggered the Fourth Amendment as the Supreme Court 
shifted the essence of the infringement from privacy interests to property inter-
ests and back to somewhere in between, without explaining whether “constitu-
tionally protected area[s]” were privacy- or property-oriented.70 
B. How Katz Changed All That 
It was not until 1967, in Katz v. United States, that the Supreme Court 
embraced privacy interests as the guiding principle for application of Fourth 
Amendment protection.71 Law enforcement agents attached a listening device 
to the outside of a public phone booth to overhear and record the defendant’s 
conversations.72 The Court held that this search infringed on the defendant’s 
privacy, on which he had “justifiably relied,” and thus warranted Fourth 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 511–12 (1961) (holding that trespass need not be established for Fourth Amendment protection 
to be applicable). 
 67 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511–12. 
 68 Id. at 506–07, 511–12. The Court noted that the scope of the Fourth Amendment was not solely 
measured by infringement on substantive property and torts rights. Id. at 511. 
 69 Id. at 506–07, 511–12. The Court began to chip away at the core principles of the Fourth 
Amendment articulated in Entick and Boyd, emphasizing a principal purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment to be “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion,” albeit they were still focused on property in terms of a “constitutionally protect-
ed area.” Id. at 511–12. Justice Douglas in his concurrence went further than simply claiming property 
rights to be nondeterminative when analyzing the scope of the Fourth Amendment; he argued for 
privacy to take a greater place in the analysis, finding its infringement to be the aggravating factor 
instead of the degree of intrusion into a protected area. Id. at 512–13 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 70 Compare Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (emphasizing privacy interests as the “essence of the of-
fence”), with Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (holding that trespass was not necessary to trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection, rather infringement into “constitutionally protected area[s]” triggered Fourth 
Amendment protection), and Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (limiting Fourth Amendment protection be-
cause government agents did not trespass onto the individual’s property). 
 71 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–53; id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 72 Id. at 348, 357–59 (majority opinion). 
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Amendment protection.73 The Court definitively stated that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places,” and moved away from the concept of 
“constitutionally protected area[s]” articulated in Silverman.74 
The Court recognized a privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment that was less general than a constitutional right to privacy but broader 
than the right to privacy individuals enjoy in the exercise of their intimate rela-
tions.75 This privacy interest is less general than a constitutional right to priva-
cy because it only protects against improper government intrusion through 
searches and seizures when an individual seeks to preserve something as pri-
vate.76 This interest is still, however, broader than the right to privacy individ-
uals enjoy in the exercise of their intimate relations articulated by the Court 
two years earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut.77 Unlike the Griswold right to 
privacy, the privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment followed the 
individual outside the bedroom or home and shielded that which the individual 
sought to keep private, even in a public place.78 Thus, the right to privacy fol-
lowed the defendant out of his home and into the phone booth that he used in 
the exercise of his right to communicate with others.79 
Justice Harlan further articulated the standard that should be used when 
assessing potential Fourth Amendment violations in his concurrence and 
termed this standard the “reasonable expectation of privacy.”80 The require-
ment has two prongs, with a subjective prong requiring that the individual “ex-
hibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and an objective prong 
requiring that the individual’s expectation be recognized by society as “reason-
                                                                                                                           
 73 Id. at 353. 
 74 Id. at 350–52; see also Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (identifying the “intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area” as the infringement determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment). 
 75 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–51 (discussing the parameters of the privacy interest protected by the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 76 See id. at 350–52 (explaining that what an individual seeks to keep private, even in a public 
place, may still be protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
 77 Compare id. at 350–52 (explaining the privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment 
follows the individual out of their home), with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965) 
(finding a general right to privacy regarding intimacy in the bedroom). Ironically, Griswold cited Boyd 
and another Fourth Amendment case, Mapp v. Ohio, when justifying the existence of a right to priva-
cy that was implicit to the rights protected by other amendments. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85; see 
also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (ruling that evidence seized illegally is inadmissible 
under the Fourth Amendment); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (holding the Fourth Amendment protects “the 
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” from government intrusion). 
 78 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–52. The Court’s description of this right in the majority opinion appears 
to be one influenced by the efforts of the individual. Id. at 351–52 (“What a person knowingly expos-
es to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But 
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”). 
 79 See id. at 350–52. 
 80 Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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able.”81 Applying this test, Harlan first reasoned that the defendant expressed 
his subjective expectation of privacy by shutting the door of the phone booth 
behind him before he made his call.82 Harlan then reasoned that the phone 
booth was a “temporarily private place” once the door was shut and the occu-
pant paid the toll to place a call, entitling the occupant to assume that the con-
versation was not being overheard by law enforcement.83 Although Harlan ul-
timately concluded that society was willing to recognize this expectation of 
privacy as reasonable, he never articulated what factors to consider in the test’s 
analysis.84 Subsequently, the Court did not articulate the parameters for this 
test, but rather shifted its focus to the question of whether an expectation of 
privacy survived when the information was shared with a third party.85 
In 1976, in United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court created the third-
party doctrine and held that the government may subpoena the records of a 
third-party bank for information given to the bank by its customers.86 It made 
no difference in the analysis that the customers believed that the information 
was confidential and only used for a limited purpose.87 The Supreme Court 
reasoned that the papers were not the defendant’s property; rather, they were 
the property of the bank.88 For example, the Court characterized the checks 
that the defendant gave the bank as “negotiable instruments” rather than “pri-
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. This expectation generally refers to a place in application, such as a home or a telephone 
booth; however, it is the person in the area, not the area itself, that is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment because it is the person’s expectations that protect their conduct in that space. Id. at 360–61. 
 82 Id. at 361. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See id. at 360–61 (noting that the objective expectation of privacy was reasonable without 
articulating any standards or considerations to factor into its analysis); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504–05 (2007) (noting that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test remains “opaque” and that justices have yet to define what objectively 
qualifies as reasonable). 
 85 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43 (holding the numbers dialed shared with a third-party phone 
company diminishes the expectation of privacy the individual has therein); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–44 
(holding there to be no Fourth Amendment infringement when information is shared with a third-party 
bank); see also Kerr, supra note 84, at 505 (noting that the Supreme Court has refrained from provid-
ing a single comprehensive test for what makes an expectation of privacy reasonable). 
 86 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–44 (holding there to be no Fourth Amendment infringement when 
information is subpoenaed from a third party to whom the information was consensually shared). 
 87 Id. The Court began its opinion by quoting a pre-Katz decision, Hoffa v. United States, where 
the Court stated that interests were not protected by the Fourth Amendment unless there was an “in-
trusion into a zone of privacy, into ‘the security a man relied upon when he places himself or his prop-
erty within a constitutionally protected area.’” Id. at 440 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 
293, 301–02 (1966)). The Court’s ruling thereby returned to a circular reasoning familiar in the case 
law, where protection from an unconstitutional search and seizure was predicated on an intrusion into 
a constitutionally protected space left undefined, until the moment the Court found it infringed upon 
and thus defined it as constitutionally protected. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 88 Miller, 425 U.S. at 440. 
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vate papers.”89 The Court premised the newly formulated third-party doctrine 
on the theory that the defendant assumed the risk that the party he or she vol-
untarily conveyed information to might convey said information to the gov-
ernment.90 
The Supreme Court soon extended the third-party doctrine to information 
individuals share with communication companies to use their services.91 In 
1979, in Smith v. Maryland, the telephone company, at the request of law en-
forcement officials, installed a pen register, a device used to record the num-
bers dialed from the phone placing the call.92 The Court found that no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy existed regarding the numbers dialed because 
those numbers were voluntarily and immediately turned over to the phone 
company in order for the call to be connected.93 This voluntary sharing of in-
formation with the phone company meant that the dialer assumed the risk of 
disclosure, and when compared with the facts from Katz, the Court held that 
pen registers do not acquire the contents of the conversation and thus warrant-
ed distinction.94 This extension of the third-party doctrine caused concern for 
some on the Court.95 In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted the prevalence of 
phone use in the lives of Americans in the late 1970s.96 He warned of the po-
                                                                                                                           
 89 Id. at 440, 442–43. The Court went further, distinguishing the language of Boyd’s protection of 
papers, making the distinction that the papers at issue in Boyd, Boyd’s business records, were personal 
papers. See id. at 440–43; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618, 630 (emphasizing the privacy and property interests 
protected in personal papers through the Fourth Amendment). The records at issue—records the bank 
kept on Miller’s activity such as canceled checks, deposit slips, and monthly statements—were “busi-
ness records of the bank.” Miller, 425 U.S. at 440–43. The Supreme Court considered the means for 
which the records were being used, and concluded that those records created by Miller, namely the 
checks, shared no expectation of privacy because they were being used as “negotiable instruments” in 
Miller’s commercial transactions. Id. The Court also justified this lack of privacy interest on the ab-
sence of property rights to the records the bank created with Miller’s information. Id. 
 90 Miller, 425 U.S. at 440–43. 
 91 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–44 (holding the numbers dialed are voluntarily divulged to the 
third-party phone company when a call is placed, thus diminishing the expectation of privacy the 
individual has thereto). 
 92 Id. at 737. Despite having previously articulated that property rights were not the fulcrum of 
the Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court still felt compelled to make clear that no trespass had been 
committed because the pen register was installed on telephone company property, leaving only the 
potential infringement of the defendant’s expectation of privacy. Id. at 741. 
 93 Id. at 744–45. 
 94 Id. at 741, 744–45. In his dissent, Justice Marshall makes the point that “whether privacy ex-
pectations are legitimate within the meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an individual can be 
presumed to accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the risks he should be forced 
to assume in a free and open society.” Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Noting the increasing prev-
alence of using phones in the late 1970s, Justice Marshall warned of the potential impediments that 
warrantless government surveillance could have on First Amendment freedoms such as political asso-
ciation and the press. Id. at 751. Just as the defendant did not expect his conversation in the phone 
booth to be broadcast to the public, Justice Marshall reasoned that the individual had a similar expec-
tation of privacy when dialing the phone number. Id. at 751–52. 
 95 Id. at 750–51 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 96 Id. 
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tential impediments that warrantless government surveillance could have on 
the use of that technology in the exercise of other rights secured by the Consti-
tution, such as the First Amendment freedoms of political association and the 
press.97 
The 21st century brought more difficult challenges to the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment.98 These challenges raised questions regarding whether 
advances in technology would continue to “shrink the realm of guaranteed pri-
vacy” protected by the Fourth Amendment.99 In 2001, in Kyllo v. United States, 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (securing, in relevant part, the right to free speech, press, 
and association). 
 98 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35 (using noninvasive technology to collect information otherwise 
not made readily available to the public infringes upon Fourth Amendment protection from warrant-
less searches and seizures). The 1980s also experienced a period of technological advances and new 
opportunities to push the limits of warrantless tracking, but the means proved less infringing to the 
Court. Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277–80 (1983) (holding there was infringe-
ment when otherwise permissible means of tracking are used to collect information otherwise not 
made available to the public), with Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–06 (holding use of GPS tracking attached 
to the tracked vehicle after it was already in the defendant’s control infringes Fourth Amendment 
protection from warrantless searches and seizures), Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35 (2001) (using noninva-
sive technology to collect information otherwise not made readily available to the public infringes 
Fourth Amendment protection from warrantless searches and seizures), and United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 713–15 (1984) (holding there was an infringement when tracking device was used to 
collect information otherwise made available to the public). 
 It is worth noting that in Kyllo, Karo, and Knotts the Supreme Court developed the distinction 
between information made available to the public and that which was not observable to the public 
with the naked eye. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32–35; Karo, 468 U.S. at 713–15; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277–80. 
In Knotts, a radio transmitter that allowed police to track its location was hidden in a product sold to 
the defendant. 460 U.S. at 278, 281. The Court held that information obtained was voluntarily made 
available to the public when one uses public roadways and areas within sight of the roadways. Id.  
Due to this lower expectation of privacy, the use of a radio transmitter to know what is already made 
available to the public through visual surveillance did not infringe on Fourth Amendment protections. 
Id. The Court did not take issue with the fact that visual surveillance had limitations the tracker did 
not; rather, the Court equated the information collected by the two and declined to consider whether 
the installation of a tracking device in the property of a third party by that third party and later sold to 
the defendant is a search. Id. at 278, 281. The next year, the Court answered the questions it declined 
to rule on in Knotts. In Karo, the Court ruled that in buying the container, Karo accepted it in its pre-
sent condition, compromised by the tracking device or not, and therefore there was no search because 
the container came to him that way. 468 U.S. at 712–14. Although the method employed was accepta-
ble to the Court, the use of the technology was not, and the actions of the government were found to 
be an infringement of the Fourth Amendment because the tracker was used to determine information 
that was not made available to the public. Id. at 714–16. Here, law enforcement officials had used the 
tracker to determine that the barrel was inside a residence. Id. This information could not have also 
been collected by visual surveillance because it had not been conveyed to the public and therefore 
could only have been otherwise collected by a physical intrusion into the home. Id. The distinction 
between information made available to the public and information not observable by the public with 
the naked eye did not factor into the Court’s analysis in Carpenter, therefore further development of 
this line of reasoning is outside the scope of this Note. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (analyzing 
the nature of the information and the nature of the instrument used in collection to determine that 
historical CSLI warranted Fourth Amendment protection). 
 99 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34 (noting that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of 
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
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the Supreme Court held that a Fourth Amendment infringement occurred when 
law enforcement officials aimed a thermal-imaging device at a residence to 
gather information about the heat signatures of the house.100 Suspicious that 
the defendant grew marijuana in his home, agents used the information to de-
termine whether said heat signatures were consistent with other marijuana 
growing operations.101 The Court held that collecting the information in this 
manner was an unreasonable search because the “sense-enhancing technology” 
obtained information that otherwise could not be collected without physical 
intrusion into the home.102 
Amidst these new challenges, the Supreme Court began a slight return to 
using property law in its Fourth Amendment analysis.103 In 2012, in United 
States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that the use of a global positioning sys-
tem (“GPS”) tracker to collect location information constituted an unreasona-
ble search under the Fourth Amendment.104 Law enforcement agents attached 
the GPS tracking device to the defendant’s wife’s car and monitored it remote-
ly.105 The Court emphasized the Fourth Amendment’s close relationship to 
property interests and recharacterized the Court’s previous deviation from the 
property-oriented jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment.106 Specifically, the 
Court characterized Katz and the expectation of privacy approach as supple-
menting, not replacing, the property-based conception of the Fourth Amend-
ment, and therefore Katz did not nullify the protections previously reasoned 
under property law.107 Importantly, in her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor not-
ed the ease of location tracking given the technology and resources at the gov-
                                                                                                                           
technology,” and framing the issue before the Court as a question of “what limits there are upon this 
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy”). 
 100 Id. at 29–31. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 34–35. The Court did, however, note that public use of the technology might render its 
use by law enforcement agents to be reasonable. Id. 
 103 See Baude & Stern, supra note 7, at 1827 n.21 (noting positive property law approaches taken 
by Justices of the Supreme Court). As Baude and Stern discuss in their article, Justice Scalia repeated-
ly used positive law rights to supplement the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Id. (citing Fer-
nandez, 571 U.S. at 308 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stressing that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test was added as a supplement to, not a substitute for, a property understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11 (same); Jones, 565 U.S. at 407–08 (same); Randolph, 547 U.S. 
at 143–45 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that changes in property law affect changes in 
Fourth Amendment application)). 
 104 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–07. Although law enforcement officials originally acquired a warrant 
to place the GPS, time limitation had tolled by the time the device was installed. Id. at 402. 
 105 Id. at 404–07. 
 106 Id. at 405–10. 
 107 Id. at 407–09; id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that in Katz, the Supreme Court 
enlarged the scope of the Fourth Amendment to include intrusions into reasonable expectations of 
privacy in addition to and without diminishing the protection from intrusions identified through in-
fringements of property rights). 
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ernment’s disposal.108 She reasoned that, unlike in the past where the confines 
of the collection device limited the information gathered and painted a limited 
picture, the volume of data now easily accessed by the government paints a far 
more complete picture of an individual’s religious, political, and personal iden-
tity.109 Alarmed by the potential chilling effect on the rights of expression and 
association by this power of surveillance, Justice Sotomayor argued that the 
potential harm from easy access to information should be weighed when con-
sidering the expectation of privacy citizens have in this information.110 
In 2014, in Riley v. California, the Supreme Court ruled that police offic-
ers could not search the content of cell phones without a warrant under the 
search incident to arrest doctrine.111 Despite the general rule that searches inci-
dent to arrest do not require a warrant, the Court held that the purposes of 
searches incident to arrest—officer safety and protection of evidence—are not 
applicable to cell phones once they are in the officer’s custody.112 Furthermore, 
the Court emphasized the “immense storage capacity” of cell phones that 
makes them unique from that which had traditionally been subject to these 
searches, given the volume of private information stored on cell phones.113 The 
“pervasiveness” of the sensitive information in phones made them unique from 
other property containing information that police could search incident to ar-
rest.114 Absent danger to the officer or the potential to destroy evidence, this 
privacy interest warranted Fourth Amendment protection.115 
II. WHAT DID CARPENTER DO TO ALL OF THIS? 
In 2018, in Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court made its most 
recent alteration to its Fourth Amendment analysis.116 As discussed above, cell 
phones communicate with cell towers to produce time-stamped location infor-
mation and cell phone carriers collect this information.117 Although carriers 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485, 2488–90 (2014) (holding that on arrest, police officers can-
not search the contents of cell phones without a warrant). Searches incident to an arrest are generally a 
recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973). These 
searches permit the arresting police officer to search the individual under arrest without a warrant 
because it is reasonable for an arresting officer to search for weapons or evidence that could be de-
stroyed. Id. 
 112 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485–86. 
 113 Id. at 2489–90. 
 114 Id. at 2490–91. 
 115 Id. 
 116 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (declining to extend the third-
party doctrine to cover CSLI and holding that the disclosure of this information to third-parties “does 
not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection”). 
 117 Id. at 2211–12. 
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primarily use this information for business purposes, under the Stored Wire 
and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access Act these 
companies disclose this information to law enforcement officials.118 
The Act provides the rights retained by, and the protections afforded to, 
users of internet services by providing causes of action to customers when 
companies improperly handle their information.119 The rights users have to this 
information is limited by § 2707 of the Act, which covers content that the gov-
ernment may compel disclosure of without a warrant.120 This information in-
cludes names, addresses, telephone connection records, the lengths of services 
rendered and the types of services utilized, telephone or instrument numbers, 
and credit card or bank account numbers.121 Under the Act, a lower standard 
than probable cause is utilized when government officials request access to 
said information.122 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Id. at 2212. The Act provides that when law enforcement officials “‘offer[] specific and articu-
lable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the records sought ‘are relevant 
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation,’” the government may compel disclosure of infor-
mation under the jurisdiction of the Act. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018)). The issue that aris-
es is the discrepancy between the probable cause standard and the standard enumerated in the Act. Id. 
at 2221; Lode, supra note 1, § 2 (noting that the standard for disclosure under the Stored Communica-
tions Act is lower than the standard applied for probable cause). “The Court usually requires ‘some 
quantum of individualized suspicion’ before a search or seizure may take place.” Carpenter, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2221 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61 (1976) (noting that un-
like the general standard, the Fourth Amendment does not have one “irreducible” standard when it 
comes to warrants, but rather the protection differs according to the reasonable expectation of privacy 
associated with the area subject to the warrant)). The Act, however, essentially requires that the law 
enforcement officials show that the requested information might be “pertinent to their ongoing inves-
tigation,” a discrepancy the Court emphasized as “gigantic.” Id. Over 12,000 time-stamped location 
points pertaining to the defendant’s location were collected over 127 days. Id. at 2212. 
 119 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712. Regulating providers of electronic communication service (“ECS”) 
and providers of remote computing service (“RCS”), the Act gives certain, albeit limited, rights to 
users. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214 (2004) (explaining 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 and 
recommending amendments to it). Identifying how many of these rights are statutorily provided is the 
first step in determining what positive law rights exist, and whether the infringement of said rights 
qualifies as a search or seizure under the positive law approach to the Fourth Amendment. See Baude 
& Stern, supra note 7, at 1836–42 (defining search or seizure under the positive law approach and 
using infringement of rights under other substantive areas of law as the critical inquiry for the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 120 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712; Kerr, supra note 119, at 1236. 
 121 18 U.S.C. § 2707; Kerr, supra note 119, at 1236. 
 122 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712; Lode, supra note 1, § 2 (noting that the standard for disclosure un-
der the Stored Communications Act is lower than the standard applied for probable cause). Section 
2702 also covers the type of information that may be voluntarily disclosed by an ECS or RCS; most of 
them pertain to circumstances where danger or harm to others would compel the servicer to recognize 
that the information should be disclosed. See § 2702; Kerr, supra note 119, at 1236 (explaining the 
type of information that may be subject to voluntary disclosure). Also relevant to Carpenter was the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which gave users the right to have their provider disclose their cell-
site information on request. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(2) (2012). See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 
2211–12. 
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Section A discusses the majority’s holding in Carpenter.123 Section B dis-
cusses the dissents in Carpenter.124 Section C discusses scholarship on the 
Fourth Amendment before and after Carpenter.125 
A. The Majority’s New Approach 
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court declined to extend the third-party doc-
trine articulated in Smith v. Maryland in 1979 and United States v. Miller in 
1976, instead holding that the doctrine diminished but did not extinguish the 
expectation of privacy an individual had in historical CSLI.126 The automatic 
sharing of this location information to third-party carriers when the individu-
al’s phone was activated did not overcome the individual’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.127 The Court reasoned 
that although disclosure to a third party diminishes the individual’s expectation 
of privacy, the diminished expectation does not necessarily put the Fourth 
Amendment out of reach.128 Thus, the information received by the government 
through its use of a subpoena was an unreasonable search because individuals 
maintained an expectation of privacy in historical CSLI within reach of the 
Fourth Amendment.129 
The Supreme Court held that the unique nature of CSLI warranted this 
protection because Smith and Miller considered both the nature of the infor-
mation collected and the capabilities of the tools used in the collection when 
determining the legitimacy of the expectation of privacy.130 As for the first 
consideration, CSLI provided both historical and contemporaneous time-
stamped location information—as if the government had “attached an ankle 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See infra notes 126–137 and accompanying text. 
 124 See infra notes 138–155 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 156–177 and accompanying text. 
 126 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979) (holding an 
individual did not have an expectation of privacy in the numbers shared with a third-party phone com-
pany); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976) (holding an individual did not have an 
expectation of privacy in information shared with a third-party bank). 
 127 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2220. 
 128 Id. at 2217, 2219–20. 
 129 Id. at 2219–20 (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485, 2488–89 (2014)) (holding 
that on arrest, police officers cannot search the contents of cell phones without a warrant). 
 130 Id. (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442); Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43 (holding the numbers dialed are 
voluntarily divulged to the third-party phone company when a call is placed, thus diminishing the 
expectation of privacy the individual has thereto); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating the reasonable expectation of privacy test). The Supreme Court 
held that pen registers, collecting the limited information of numbers dialed, and checks, negotiable 
instruments, both lack the capabilities to reveal comparably “identifying information” as the cell tow-
ers at bar. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17, 2219–20 (considering the capabilities of the surveil-
lance systems as well as the information collected when considering the expectation of privacy); see 
also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (considering the capacities and volume of sensitive information stored 
by cell phones in determining the expectation of privacy). 
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monitor” to the suspect.131 The Court then considered the capabilities of 
CSLI.132 Here, the Court found no limitations on the pervasive information 
collected because carriers compiled CSLI automatically and the government 
effortlessly received this information by requesting it via subpoena.133 
Not only was this information and its form of collection distinguishable 
from Smith and Miller, but the Court also discussed a third consideration in 
reasoning that the third-party doctrine should not apply to CSLI: the user did 
not voluntarily share their CSLI.134 The user did not meaningfully assume the 
risk of potential disclosure because only by disconnecting the phone from its 
service could the user stop the information from being shared.135 The Court 
premised the significance of this factor on cell phones being a “pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life,” such that “carrying one is indispensable to partici-
pation in modern society.”136 Nevertheless, the Court made it clear that its de-
cision was narrow and stressed that the subject of its decision was the “unique” 
nature of historical CSLI, and not the use of real-time CSLI or “tower dumps” 
not before the Court.137 
B. Diverging Dissents 
In Carpenter, four justices dissented and framed their dissents using 
property-based conceptions of the Fourth Amendment.138 A property-based 
approach to the Fourth Amendment requires a property interest to be infringed 
upon for the Court to find a “search” that triggers the application of the Fourth 
Amendment.139 A similar but broader approach to the property conception is 
                                                                                                                           
 131 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
 132 See id. at 2219. 
 133 Id. at 2216–17, 2219–20. 
 134 Id. at 2220. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484). 
 137 Id. 
 138 See id. at 2235 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“This case should be resolved by interpreting ac-
cepted property principles as the baseline for reasonable expectations of privacy.”); id. at 2235 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[This case] should turn . . . on whose property was searched . . . . By obtain-
ing the cell-site records of MetroPCS and Sprint, the Government did not search Carpenter’s property. 
He did not create the records . . . [or] maintain them, he cannot control them . . . [or] destroy them.”); 
id. at 2257 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he cell-site records obtained by the government belong to Car-
penter’s cell service providers, not to Carpenter . . . . Carpenter . . . has no meaningful control over the 
cell-site records, which are created, maintained, altered, used, and eventually destroyed by his cell 
service providers.”); id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the defendant had some proper-
ty rights to his CSLI under the Stored Communications Act but that this argument was not made and 
thus the case could not be resolved on these grounds). 
 139 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled in part by Katz, 389 U.S. 
at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding absent a trespass on the suspect’s property there was no 
search sufficient to trigger the Fourth Amendment); Baude & Stern, supra note 7, at 1827 n.21 (noting 
that property rights as triggers for the Fourth Amendment have seen intermittent application but a 
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the positive law model for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which replaces 
inquiries into reasonableness with the question of whether the investigative 
acts taken would be unlawful if the government actor was a similarly situated 
private actor.140 The appeal of these approaches is that analysis for Fourth 
Amendment protection is grounded in principles less circular than the second 
objective prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, which in some 
cases appears to reduce to judicial determinations about social norms and poli-
cy judgments.141 
In his dissent in Carpenter, Justice Kennedy argued that a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy should be determined by property principles.142 Justice 
Kennedy reasoned that the defendant did not own the business records that 
contained sensitive information about him and thus, under Smith and Miller, 
they were subject to the third-party doctrine and the defendant had no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in them.143 Justice Alito’s dissent followed similar 
form and concluded that the defendant had no property rights to the CSLI.144 
Justice Alito went further to emphasize that no such property rights could be 
found under the Stored Communications Act because the Act included express 
exemptions for disclosure to the government.145 
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, echoed Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that 
the defendant had no property rights to the records and thus the Fourth 
Amendment afforded him no protection.146 Justice Thomas’s dissent is distinct, 
however, in that it argues that Katz should be abandoned because the “expecta-
tions of privacy,” integral to its test, were never the aim of the Fourth Amend-
ment.147 Rather, the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment is the protec-
                                                                                                                           
comprehensive theory has not been argued before the Court) (citing Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 
292, 308 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stressing that the reasonable expectation of privacy test was 
added as a supplement to, not a substitute for the property understanding of the Fourth Amendment); 
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013) (same); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) 
(same); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 143–45 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
changes in property law affect changes in Fourth Amendment application)). 
 140 Baude & Stern, supra note 7, at 1825; see also Kerr, supra note 84, at 516–19 (noting that the 
positive law approach has deep roots in the history of the Fourth Amendment). Professor Orin Kerr, in 
his article, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, explains that the model has been adopted 
or rejected by multiple opinions. Kerr, supra note 84, at 516–19. Baude and Stern note some of the 
wavering arguments and lines of reasoning traced in the line of cases above as support for the idea that 
the Court has already been using aspects of positive law for years, particularly when defining seizure 
as distinct from search and reasoning why police may fly over one’s property. Baude & Stern, supra 
note 7, at 1827. 
 141 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 142 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 143 Id. at 2224. 
 144 Id. at 2257–58 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 2235–36 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 147 Id. at 2238–40, 2244. 
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tion of property and any protection of privacy is incidental to the protected 
property.148 
Finally, Justice Gorsuch agreed with Justice Thomas’s argument that the 
history of the Fourth Amendment does not support the Katz test.149 Wondering 
what is left of the Fourth Amendment under the third-party doctrine, he noted 
that given the use of the Internet today for most tasks—from keeping calen-
dars, to communicating, to banking, to entertainment—companies accessed 
through the Internet are as much keeping records for us as they are keeping 
records about us.150 The sensitivity of the documents kept by these companies 
is similar to those that were once “locked safely in desk drawer or destroyed” 
and because of this sensitivity, Justice Gorsuch argued for alternative means to 
protect them.151 
Justice Gorsuch suggested supplementing the Katz test by adopting posi-
tive law anchors.152 Reading the Stored Communications Act and the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, Justice Gorsuch argued that the statutes give cus-
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. at 2240. Justice Thomas recognizes that Entick, Wilkes, The Writs of Assistance Case, and 
Boyd all discussed the protection of privacy, but posits that the primary aim of the Fourth Amendment 
was the protection of property and that any protection of privacy was incidental to the protected prop-
erty, and, thus, Katz elevating the protection of privacy over property was erroneous. Id. (citing 
THOMAS CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 3.4.4 (2008)); 
see Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating the reasonable expectation of priva-
cy test). Clancy suggests that, in Katz, the Supreme Court confused the reason for the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protection with the rights secured by the Amendment itself. CLANCY, supra, at 78. Clancy 
discusses the following syllogism to illustrate the confusion: 
[The Fourth Amendment’s] operative function is exclusionary: it works negatively to 
keep out the unwelcome agencies of government. It logically follows, however, that 
where something is to be kept out, that from which it is barred deserves recognition in a 
positive sense. It is for this reason that the fourth amendment should be looked upon as 
safeguarding an affirmative right of privacy. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Clancy concedes that the right is exclusionary but warns against 
seeking positive attributes beyond the right of exclusion itself because they may limit the right itself. 
Id. The attributes of privacy are “mere motivations for exercising the right; they do not define it.” Id. 
 149 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2264–65, 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 150 Id. at 2262. Justice Gorsuch also takes issue with the use of assumption of risk as a guiding 
principle for the Court in the application of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2263 (citing Richard A. 
Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1204 (2009)) (distinguishing the knowledge of a risk from assumption of 
the risk by consent). Epstein notes there is a distinction between knowing the risk of being hit by a car 
when walking down a street and consenting to being hit by a random motorist as if an agreement had 
been reached between the driver and victim. Epstein, supra, at 1204. This distinction suggests that the 
concept has little practical application in the context of sharing information given the development 
and principles of assumption of risk—namely that an assumption of risk entails an agreement, where-
by one accepts the risk of harms that might result, either expressly or implied. See Carpenter, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 151 Id. at 2262. 
 152 Id. at 2268. Positive law anchors refer to rights conferred to the individual under a substantive 
body of law such as property or tort. See Kerr, supra note 84, at 516. 
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tomers some form of a right to exclude and control the collected infor-
mation.153 Given these limited rights to the information and the relationship 
that this storage takes, Justice Gorsuch suggested that this relationship is a 
bailment, thus preserving the rights statutorily retained in the information.154 
Justice Gorsuch noted that, had this argument been preserved, the expectations 
of privacy in this information might not be diminished because of the bail-
ment.155 
C. Scholarly Interpretations 
Before Carpenter, many scholars focused on what warranted a “reasona-
ble” search under the Fourth Amendment to better understand the Supreme 
Court’s inconsistent approaches.156 Some scholars suggest that reasonableness 
should be informed by both common-sense tort reasonableness standards and 
the values that inform other constitutional rights.157 Recognizing that, at times, 
some constitutional rights are “independent hurdles” for a reasonableness 
standard, these scholars suggest that other constitutional rights can be used as 
benchmarks.158 They reason that when a search or seizure is accompanied by 
other government action that approaches the limits of these other constitutional 
rights, the search may be unreasonable.159 
Other scholars suggest that the Supreme Court uses four models of Fourth 
Amendment analysis—(1) the probabilistic model;160 (2) the private facts 
model;161 (3) the positive law model;162 and (4) the policy model.163 The bene-
                                                                                                                           
 153 § 222(c)(1)–(2), (h)(1)(A); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice 
Gorsuch suggests the Acts do so by requiring that carriers do not “use, disclose, or permit access” to 
this information absent the customer’s consent, while allowing customers the right to disclose the 
information at their discretion. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also 
§ 222(c)(1). 
 154 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch notes that Ex parte 
Jackson suggests a constitutional floor for the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2270–71; 
see also Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (essentially ruling that Congress’s postal power 
could not trump the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the mailer’s rights to their property mailed). 
Justice Gorsuch labeled this mail carrier relationship in Jackson as a bailment and noted the property 
interests protected when the defendant’s bailment to the government did not diminish the constitution-
al guarantees to be free from search and seizure. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2269–71 (Gorsuch, J., dis-
senting). 
 155 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 156 Amar, supra note 48, at 804–05; see also, Kerr, supra note 84. 
 157 See Amar, supra note 48, at 801, 804–05. 
 158 Id. at 804–05. 
 159 Id. at 805. 
 160 See Kerr, supra note 84 at 506, 542, 549–51. The probabilistic model is a descriptive approach 
premised on prevailing social norms. Id. at 508–09. The higher the perceived probability that the indi-
vidual’s affairs will not be surveilled, the more likely it is that the Court will afford Fourth Amend-
ment protection. Id. 
 161 Id. at 512. The private facts model is a normative assessment that considers the nature of the 
information collected and considers whether that information warrants constitutional protection. Id. 
2244 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2221 
fit of the Court using these four models is their flexibility.164 Flexibility pro-
vides value to the Court because the justices do not share a unifying goal in 
their application of the Fourth Amendment.165 Although some of these ap-
proaches can be seen in Carpenter’s reasoning—the majority employed a form 
of the private facts model by considering the revealing nature of the CSLI and 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent argued for the adoption of a positive law approach—
scholars continue to search for a unifying theory of the Fourth Amendment.166 
Scholars publishing post-Carpenter have tried to decipher what factors 
the Supreme Court used implicitly in its decision, so as to better understand the 
Court and try to predict how Fourth Amendment protection may apply in the 
future.167 Some scholars have identified five implicit factors in Fourth 
Amendment precedent and the majority’s approach to the second, objective 
prong of the expectation of privacy test.168 These factors are: (1) whether a 
technique is hidden; (2) whether the technique is continuous; (3) how indis-
criminate the technique is; (4) how intrusive the technique is; and (5) the ex-
pense and effort required by the technique.169 Scholars applying these factors 
to Carpenter argue that the CSLI acquisition was hidden because society did 
not expect their every movement to be monitored by government agents.170 
They also proffered that the technique was continuous because it not only gave 
the suspects’ current location but also a time-stamped history of where they 
were as far back as the companies collected CSLI.171 These scholars argue that 
                                                                                                                           
 162 Id. at 516. The positive law model is a descriptive approach that considers whether another 
substantive area of law prohibits the government’s actions during the search or seizure. Id. 
 163 Id. at 519. The policy model is the approach employed when judges make normative value 
judgements to determine the reasonableness of a search. Id. 
 164 Id. at 542, 550–51. 
 165 See id. at 506. 
 166 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–19 (holding, in a five to four decision, that the third-party 
doctrine does not extinguish the expectation of privacy afforded to CSLI under the Fourth Amend-
ment, despite this information being shared with a third party, because of the revealing nature of the 
information); id. at 2262, 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the defendant had some property 
rights to his CSLI under federal statutes and that positive rights should be used to ground the Katz 
test); Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 219–21 (2018) (identifying factors the Court implicitly considered when 
determining the second objective prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test); Holland, supra 
note 25, at 60, 95–96 (accepting that only persons, houses, papers, and effects are covered by the 
Fourth Amendment and arguing that papers are a special subclass protected by the Fourth Amendment 
because they are “cognitive artifacts” of the “freedom of thought” protected by the Constitution). 
 167 See Freiwald & Smith, supra note 166, at 219–21 (identifying five factors that may help ana-
lyzing how the Supreme Court may rule in future cases); Holland, supra note 25 at 60, 95–96 (arguing 
that papers, as cognitive artifacts of the freedom of thought protected by the Constitution, should con-
tinue to be protected in future cases). 
 168 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 166, at 219–21. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
2019] Collect Call for Clarification 2245 
the acquisition of CSLI was indiscriminate because information unrelated to 
the cause of the investigation could be revealed and that the technique was un-
acceptably intrusive, revealing the intimacies of the person’s life as if they 
were wearing an “ankle monitor.”172 These scholars also conclude that the ex-
pense and effort was too minimal for the government with this technique, argu-
ing that these costs provide a friction that itself protects privacy interests.173 
Other scholars take a different approach by accepting that only “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects” are covered by the Fourth Amendment.174 Never-
theless, these scholars argue that functionally a special subclass of papers—
undisclosed papers, shared confidences, and directed transmissions—are pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment because they are “cognitive artifacts” of the 
“freedom of thought” protected by the Constitution.175 They note that un-
checked application of the third-party doctrine to all digital media has a 
chilling effect on rights enjoyed under the Constitution.176 Thus, these scholars 
argue that such “cognitive artifacts” require protection from the third-party 
doctrine in their newer digital forms as proxies for the personal papers of the 
past.177 
III. FINDING ANOTHER FACTOR 
Analyzing the history of the Fourth Amendment and its precedent reveals 
an implicit logic to the Amendment that the United States Supreme Court 
reemphasized in Carpenter v. United States.178 The Fourth Amendment pro-
                                                                                                                           
 172 Id. (citing Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218). 
 173 Id. at 220–21. 
 174 Holland, supra note 25, at 60; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 175 Holland, supra note 25, at 63, 87–90, 95. Cognitive artifacts are any means used to aid one’s 
mental faculties. Id. at 63. Cognitive science suggests that these means are integral to cognitive sys-
tems. Id. at 87–90. Freedom of thought is a liberty interest implicitly protected by the rights to priva-
cy, free speech, association, assembly, and religion. See id. at 61, 78–80. 
 176 Id. at 95. 
 177 Id. at 81, 95–99 (arguing that cognitive science supports the role they play as a means for 
exercising freedom of thought). 
 178 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218–21 (2018); United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(articulating the reasonable expectation of privacy test and its two prongs: (1) subjective belief that 
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) willingness of society to accept that expectation 
of privacy as reasonable); Amar, supra note 48, at 804–05 (arguing the values of other constitutional 
rights should inform the reasonableness of the search); Brannon, supra note 25, at 20, 22–23 (noting 
that the Carpenter majority, which included Justice Sotomayor, seemed to embrace the position of 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones that considered the effect of the search on revealing the 
exercise of other rights) (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)); Holland, supra 
note 25, at 64, 95–96 (accepting that only “persons, houses, papers, and effects” are covered by the 
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tects more than just the instruments enumerated in the Amendment’s language; 
it implicitly protects the means used for exercising other constitutionally se-
cured rights from unwarranted searches and seizures.179 Not only does this log-
ic help explain the Fourth Amendment’s strained history, it also grounds the 
objective prong of the Katz v. United States test.180 This logic also informs us 
how Carpenter’s qualification of the third-party doctrine may be extended to 
other advances in technology.181 
Although the aforementioned scholarship helps us determine when a 
technique of surveillance might go too far, these approaches still miss a criti-
cal, albeit implicit, factor to understanding what the Fourth Amendment is pro-
tecting and why.182 By analyzing whether the instrument being searched or the 
information incident to its function is a pervasive means for exercising other 
rights, we develop greater consistency in understanding the Court’s precedents 
and understand what future technology might warrant protection.183 This factor 
                                                                                                                           
Fourth Amendment and arguing that papers are a special subclass protected by the Fourth Amendment 
because they are “cognitive artifacts” of the “freedom of thought” protected by the Constitution); 
Kerr, supra note 84, at 512 (explaining the private rights approach to Fourth Amendment applica-
tion—a normative approach that considers the nature of the information and whether or not it warrants 
protection). Holland notes that unchecked application of the third-party doctrine to all digital media 
has a chilling effect on rights enjoyed under the Constitution. See Holland, supra note 25, at 95. 
 179 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–21 (noting the prevalence and variety of cell phone use and 
reasoning that although CSLI is not personal papers, the information from CSLI is so pervasive and 
revealing that their reasonable expectation of privacy is lessened but not destroyed when shared with a 
third party); Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that unlike in the past 
where gathered information was limited and thus painted a limited picture of the life monitored, the 
volume of data now easily accessed by the government can paint a picture of an individual’s religious, 
political, and personal identity, creating a potential chilling effect on the rights of expression and as-
sociation with pervasive surveillance and that such effect on exercise of rights must be considered in 
any balance); Amar, supra note 48, at 804–05 (arguing the values of other constitutional rights should 
inform the reasonableness of the search). 
 180 See Brannon, supra note 25, at 20, 22 (noting that the Carpenter majority, which included 
Justice Sotomayor, seemed to embrace the position of Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, 
which held that the pervasiveness of digital communication makes the third-party doctrine “ill suited” 
and warned of its chilling effects) (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)); Hol-
land, supra note 25, at 64, 95–96 (accepting that only “persons, houses, papers, and effects” are cov-
ered by the Fourth Amendment and arguing that papers are a special subclass protected by the Fourth 
Amendment because they are “cognitive artifacts” of the “freedom of thought” protected by the Con-
stitution). Holland notes that unchecked application of the third-party doctrine to all digital media has 
a chilling effect on rights enjoyed under the Constitution. See Holland, supra note 25, at 95. 
 181 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–21. 
 182 See generally Freiwald & Smith, supra note 166 (identifying factors the Court implicitly con-
sidered when determining the second objective prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test); 
Holland, supra note 25 (accepting that only “persons, houses, papers, and effects” are covered by the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 183 See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text; see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 630 (1886) (holding that to protect the individual’s right from self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment the papers had to be protected under the Fourth Amendment from warrantless search and 
seizure). 
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complements scholarship that encourages consideration of other constitutional 
rights as a benchmark in determining reasonableness;184 however, instead of 
the values of the other rights informing reasonableness, judges are effectively 
deciding a search’s reasonableness by considering whether the search intimate-
ly reveals the exercise of the other rights.185 Furthermore, this factor refines the 
private facts model because it identifies the type of revealing information with 
which the Supreme Court is concerned.186 Analysis of the concerns expressed 
throughout the Court’s precedent further illustrates that this factor implicitly 
grounds the second, objective prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test.187 Section A of this Part demonstrates the presence of this factor in the 
history and precedent of the Fourth Amendment.188 Section B analyzes this 
factor as part of the reasonable expectation of privacy test.189 Section C ana-
lyzes this factor in the Carpenter decision.190 
A. Historical Trends 
The English cases discussed above—Entick v. Carrington, decided in 
1765, and Wilkes v. Wood, decided in 1763—regard the warrantless search of 
the means used to express the speaker’s other rights, namely political speech, 
that angered the Crown.191 Lord Camden’s rulings in favor of both defendants 
stand for the proposition that cause is necessary for such searches, seizures, 
and arrests to be valid, ensuring procedural guards protect the then-pervasive 
means of communication.192 This idea is reinforced in Ex parte Jackson, where 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See Amar, supra note 48, at 801, 804–05 (arguing that the values of other constitutional rights 
should inform the reasonableness of the search). 
 185 See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text. 
 186 See Kerr, supra note 84, at 512 (explaining the private facts approach that considers the nature 
of the information and whether it warrants Fourth Amendment protection). 
 187 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the GPS device gives 
the government information about the familial, political, professional, religious and sexual associa-
tions of the person); Smith, 442 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the increasing prevalence 
of using phones in the late 1970s and warning of the potential impediments that warrantless govern-
ment surveillance could have on first amendment freedoms such as political associations and the 
press); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (protecting means of communication from unwar-
ranted search and seizures in the mail); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1029, 1029–31, 
1066–67 (C.P. 1765) (original at Harvard University) (standing for the principle that cause is needed 
for search and seizure); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1153, 1169–70 (C.P. 1763) (original at 
Harvard University) (standing for the proposition that cause is necessary for such searches, seizures, 
and arrests to be valid); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (securing, in relevant part, the right to free 
speech, press, and association). 
 188 See infra notes 191–202 and accompanying text. 
 189 See infra notes 203–213 and accompanying text. 
 190 See infra notes 214–231 and accompanying text. 
 191 Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1029–31, 1066–67; Wilkes, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1169–70; see 
also Stuntz, supra note 33, at 397, 400 (noting Entick as an influential case at the founding). 
 192 See Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 1066–67; Stuntz, supra note 33, at 400. 
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the United States Supreme Court held that letters and other sealed packages in 
the mail are “fully guarded from examination and inspection.”193 Inspection of 
the letters delivered by the postal service would have revealed the content of 
the communication in the exercise of the constitutionally protected right to free 
speech and press.194 
In Boyd v. United States, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a stat-
ute that authorized the use of subpoenas to order the production of invoices in 
an action against the defendant because this was functionally the same as a 
warrantless search and seizure.195 Here, the means of communication were 
used in the course of business and as the Supreme Court suggested in United 
States v. Miller, it is unwilling to protect these means of communication.196 
The warrantless search of these means, however, affected the defendant’s abil-
ity to exercise a different right, namely the right against self-incrimination.197 
Thus, despite the charges being civil, not criminal, the Court went on to use the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection to secure the Fifth Amendment’s protection 
from self-incrimination.198 The Court explicitly stated that the Fourth Amend-
ment protected rights broader than just privacy or property, encompassing an 
“indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private proper-
ty.”199 
In 1961, in Silverman v. United States, the Supreme Court found law en-
forcement officials intruded a “constitutionally protected area” absent any fur-
                                                                                                                           
 193 See Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (holding Congress’s right to facilitate the postal service did not 
extinguish the rights enjoyed under the Fourth Amendment). 
 194 See id. (holding Congress’s right to facilitate the postal service did not extinguish the rights 
enjoyed under the Fourth Amendment); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (securing, in relevant part, the 
right to free speech, press, and association). The only permissible inspection absent a warrant was 
outwardly apparent observations, such as the letter or package’s weight and shape. Jackson, 96 U.S. at 
733. 
 195 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617–20, 630 (1886) (holding that to protect the individual’s right from 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment the papers had to be protected under the Fourth 
Amendment from warrantless search and seizure); Amar, supra note 48, at 787 (noting the merging of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments’ analysis in Boyd). Under the statute, if the subpoenaed documents 
were not produced, the allegations reliant on such papers would be presumed confessed. Boyd, 116 
U.S. at 619–21; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (securing, in relevant part, the right to free speech, 
press, and association). 
 196 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440, 442–44 (1976) (holding checks and the bank’s 
business records were not protected by the Fourth Amendment once the information was shared with a 
third party); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617–20, 630 (protecting business records to protect the individual’s 
right against self-incrimination). 
 197 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617–20, 630 (protecting business records subpoenaed by the govern-
ment because failure to do so would prevent the individual from exercising his right to not self-
incriminate); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (securing, in relevant part, an individual’s right to re-
frain from self-incriminating). 
 198 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
 199 Id. 
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ther explanation besides suggesting that a house is always one such area.200 
Implicit in this reasoning, however, is the role the home plays in terms of the 
exercise of constitutionally protected rights, suggestive of the personal security 
and liberty the Supreme Court protected in Boyd.201 Given the role the home 
plays in the exercise of many constitutional rights, including the right to priva-
cy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, protecting the home functionally 
protects the exercise of these rights from being revealed.202 
B. Factor in Katz 
In Katz v. United States, in 1967, the Court continued to consider this im-
plicit factor––whether the subject of the search was a pervasive means for ex-
ercising other rights––but buried it in the second objective prong of the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test.203 The Court explicitly noted the “vital 
role” that telephones play in society as a means for private communication and 
reasoned that the Fourth Amendment must be adaptable for such advances.204 
As the aforementioned scholars suggest, the Court seemed concerned with this 
warrantless surveillance because it indiscriminately surveilled those private 
constitutionally protected conversations unrelated to the investigation.205 As 
shown throughout the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions, this concern 
about collateral surveillance of protected conversations is only relevant if the 
Court recognizes that telephones are, in the broader society, a medium suffi-
ciently pervasive in the exercise of other constitutionally protected rights.206 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 506–07, 511–12 (1961) (holding that trespass need 
not be established for Fourth Amendment protection to be applicable). The Court made clear that the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment was not measured by infringement on substantive property and tort 
rights but did not say those rights were irrelevant to determining its limits. See id. at 511–12. The 
Court began to return to the core principles of the Fourth Amendment articulated in Entick and Boyd, 
emphasizing that one principle of the Fourth Amendment is “the right of a man to retreat into his own 
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion,” albeit they were still focused on 
property in terms of a “constitutionally protected area.” Id.; see Boyd, 16 U.S. at 617–20, 630 (protect-
ing business records to protect Boyd’s right against self-incrimination); Entick, 19 Howell’s St. Tr., at 
1066–67 (1765) (standing for the principle that cause is needed for search and seizure). 
 201 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (holding the Fourth Amendment protected an “indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty and private property”); supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 202 See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (using the “intrusion into a constitutionally protected area” as 
the infringement determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 484–85 (1965) (finding a general right to privacy regarding intimacy in the bedroom). 
 203 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–52 (noting the “vital role” telephones play in private communica-
tion throughout society and describing the privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment); id. at 
360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 204 Id. at 350–52 (majority opinion). 
 205 See Freiwald & Smith, supra note 166, at 219–21 (identifying factors the Court implicitly 
considered when determining the second objective prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test). 
 206 See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text; see also Brannon, supra note 25, at 20, 22–
23 (noting that the Carpenter majority, which included Justice Sotomayor, seemed to embrace the 
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This idea is further supported by scholars who argue the intimate role papers 
played in society warranted their protection under the Fourth Amendment.207 
Whether the instrument being searched is a pervasive means for exercising 
other rights helps us understand what the Court meant when it said that the 
expectation of privacy must be one that society is willing to recognize as rea-
sonable.208 
The Supreme Court in Katz made it clear that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places,” and viewed in light of the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Ex parte Jackson and Boyd, this extends to the means used to exercise 
the people’s rights secured under the Constitution.209 The Supreme Court de-
fined the privacy interest as, at once, less general but broader than a constitu-
tional right to privacy.210 This distinction reflects the language of the Court in 
Boyd that the Fourth Amendment protected rights broader than just privacy or 
property, including an “indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty 
and private property.”211 Boyd’s language reflects many of the rights secured 
by the Constitution, such as the property and liberty interests protected by the 
Fifth Amendment.212 Understanding that, at its core, the Fourth Amendment 
warrants society to recognize an expectation of privacy as reasonable when a 
search would reveal the exercise of other rights provides clarity to the Katz test 
and greater coherence throughout the Court’s precedent.213 
                                                                                                                           
position of Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, which held that the pervasiveness of digital 
communication makes the third-party doctrine “ill suited” and warned of its chilling effects) (empha-
sis in original omitted) (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)); Freiwald & Smith, 
supra note 166, at 219–21 (identifying factors the Court implicitly considered when determining the 
second objective prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 207 See Holland, supra note 25, at 64, 95–96. 
 208 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test); Amar, supra note 48, at 804–05 (arguing that the values of other constitutional rights 
should inform the reasonableness of the search). 
 209 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–52 (noting the “vital role” telephones play in private communica-
tion throughout society and describing the privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment); id. at 
360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the reasonable expectation of privacy test); Boyd, 116 
U.S. at 617–20, 630 (merging the analysis of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments such that the Fourth 
Amendment protects the suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); Jackson, 96 
U.S. at 733 (warrantless search of letters in the mail by the government infringes Fourth Amendment 
protection). 
 210 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–53; see supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 211 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–53 (describing the privacy protected under the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (describing the protection of the Fourth Amendment to be 
broader than just property or privacy rights). 
 212 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[No]r be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation.”). 
 213 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (describing the protection of the Fourth Amendment to be 
broader than just property or privacy rights); Amar, supra note 48, at 804–05 (arguing the values of 
other constitutional rights should inform the reasonableness of the search). 
2019] Collect Call for Clarification 2251 
C. Factor in Carpenter 
Grounding the Katz test in this implicit threshold question better explains 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Carpenter.214 The Court begins its decision by 
noting the prevalence of phones, stating that cell phones are a “pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life” such that “carrying one is indispensable to partici-
pation in modern society.”215 The Court’s emphasis on the role cell phones 
play mirrors the determination the Court made in Katz when it noted the vital 
role that telephones play in society as a means for communication before rea-
soning that the Fourth Amendment must be adaptable for such advances.216 
In recharacterizing the scope of the third-party doctrine, the Court rea-
soned that although disclosure to a third party diminishes the individual’s ex-
pectation of privacy to the information, the diminished expectation does not 
necessarily put the Fourth Amendment out of reach.217 The Court implicitly 
considered the role the phone played in the life of the individual being tracked 
when it found that CSLI warranted protection, noting that only by disconnect-
ing the phone from its service could the user not share this information.218 
Furthermore, the manner in which the Court distinguished the surveilled 
information in Smith v. Maryland from CSLI further supports this theory that 
the Court is protecting the exercise of other rights through the Fourth Amend-
ment.219 Unlike the information in Smith, which was limited, the CSLI in Car-
penter “provide[d] an intimate window” into the defendant’s life and “re-
veal[ed] not only [the defendant’s] particular movements, but through them his 
‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”220 The 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (declining to extend the third-party doctrine to cover CSLI 
and holding that the disclosure of this information to third-parties “does not by itself overcome the 
user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection”). 
 215 Id. at 2220 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014)). 
 216 Compare id. (noting the pervasiveness of cell phones), with Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–52 (noting 
the wide use of telephones for private communication). 
 217 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488). 
 218 See id. at 2219–20. 
 219 See id. at 2217, 2220 (“Yet this case is not about ‘using a phone’ or a person’s movement at a 
particular time. It is about a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, 
every moment, over several years. Such a chronicle implicates privacy concerns far beyond those 
considered in Smith and Miller.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (securing, in relevant part, the right 
to free speech, press, and association); Smith, 422 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the 
increasing prevalence of using phones in the late 1970s and warning of the potential impediments that 
warrantless government surveillance could have on First Amendment freedoms such as political asso-
ciations and the press). 
 220 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); 
Smith, 422 U.S. at 742–44 (holding the numbers dialed are voluntarily divulged to the third-party 
phone company and do not warrant protection by the Fourth Amendment under the third-party doc-
trine). 
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CSLI was essentially an imprint of the defendant exercising his other rights, 
and the Supreme Court found this mass-surveillance unacceptable.221 
Although the Carpenter dissents and their property-based approaches are 
supported by the Supreme Court’s former use of these concepts, in cases like 
Olmstead v. United States and Goldman v. United States, the Court had long 
since departed from this strict line of reasoning.222 As the Supreme Court rec-
ognized in Jones v. United States, Katz supplemented the property-based ap-
proach.223 To argue that property rights alone should dictate the outcome in 
Carpenter deviates from the implicit factor discussed above and the coherence 
it reveals in the Fourth Amendment’s precedent.224 Furthermore, as more indi-
viduals move their information online and use third-party services to organize 
their lives, the dissents’ conception of the Fourth Amendment would provide 
them with little to no protection because it does not take the information’s re-
vealing nature into consideration.225 
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court quoted Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
in Jones, where she noted that unlike in the past, where the confines of the col-
lection device limited the information gathered and painted a limited picture of 
the life monitored, the volume of data now easily accessed by the government 
could have a potential chilling effect on the rights of expression and associa-
tion.226 Justice Sotomayor, in Jones, argued that the potential harms from easy 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 400, 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring)) (noting that the CSLI gives the government information about the familial, political, profes-
sional, religious, and sexual associations of the person). 
 222 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“This case should be resolved by 
interpreting accepted property principles as the baseline for reasonable expectations of privacy.”); id. 
at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[This case] should turn . . . on whose property was searched . . . . 
By obtaining the cell-site records of MetroPCS and Sprint, the government did not search Carpenter’s 
property. He did not create the records . . . [or] maintain them, he cannot control them . . . [or] destroy 
them.”); id. at 2257 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he cell-site records obtained by the Government belong 
to Carpenter’s cell service providers, not to Carpenter . . . . Carpenter . . . has no meaningful control 
over the cell-site records, which are created, maintained, altered, used, and eventually destroyed by his 
cell service providers.”); id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the defendant had some 
property rights to his CSLI under the Stored Communications Act but that this argument was not 
made and thus the case could not be resolved on these grounds); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 
129, 134–35 (1942) (holding the Fourth Amendment was not triggered by wiretapping in the absence 
of a trespass onto the individual’s property); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 466 
(1928) (holding the Fourth Amendment was not triggered by eavesdropping in the absence of a tres-
pass onto the individual’s property). 
 223 Jones, 565 U.S. at 407–09 (characterizing Katz and the expectation of privacy approach as 
supplementing, not replacing, the property-based conception of the Fourth Amendment); see also 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test). 
 224 See supra notes 222–223 and accompanying text. 
 225 See supra note 219 (discussing the extent of the information CSLI reveals); supra note 222 
(illustrating the property-based approaches taken by the dissenters). 
 226 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; see Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see 
also Brannon, supra note 25, at 20, 22–23 (noting that the Carpenter majority, which included Justice 
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access to this information should be considered when determining the expecta-
tion of privacy.227 This concern echoes Justice Marshall’s dissent in Smith 
when he noted that allowing warrantless surveillance could create potential 
impediments on First Amendment freedoms, such as political association and 
press, because of the increasing prevalence of phones.228 
The implicit factor discussed above—that at its core the Fourth Amend-
ment protects pervasive means of exercising other constitutional rights—helps 
explain the Court’s reasoning in Carpenter and informs how Fourth Amend-
ment protection may be extended in the future.229 Carpenter illustrates that the 
Supreme Court has shifted its focus to the revealing nature of the search and 
not simply whether the individual shared the information.230 It also illustrates 
how revealing the information in question must be to warrant protection, and 
reinforced that it will protect information that reveals the exercise of other 
rights.231 
CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the history of the Fourth Amendment and its precedent re-
veals the Court’s concern with applying the third-party doctrine to widely used 
means of exercising other constitutionally secured rights. When the pervasive-
ness of the information would allow the government to track these activities 
without a warrant and potentially have a chilling effect on the exercise of these 
rights, the means should be protected. This will be done under the guise of the 
second prong of the Katz test. Accepting this principle as the implicit logic that 
the Court employs allows us to understand that Carpenter’s qualification of the 
third-party doctrine will likely be extended to other advances in technology 
                                                                                                                           
Sotomayor, seemed to embrace the position of Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, which held 
that the pervasiveness of digital communication makes the third-party doctrine “ill suited” and warned 
of its chilling effects). 
 227 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 228 Compare id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the volume of data now easily 
accessed by the Government can paint a picture of an individual’s religious, political, and personal 
identity, creating a potential chilling effect on the rights of expression and association with pervasive 
surveillance), with Smith, 422 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (warning of the potential impedi-
ments that warrantless government surveillance could have on First Amendment freedoms such as 
political associations and the press). See also U.S. CONST. amend. I (securing, in relevant part, the 
right to free speech, press, and association).  
 229 See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text. 
 230 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–19 (discussing how using CSLI was like “attach[ing] an 
ankle monitor” to the suspect and the types of intimate information the data could reveal). 
 231 Compare id. (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)) (emphasizing that 
the CSLI in Carpenter “provided an intimate window” into the defendant’s life and “reveal[ed] not 
only [the defendant’s] particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations’”), with Smith, 422 U.S. at 742–44 (holding that the numbers dialed 
are voluntarily divulged to the third-party phone company and do not warrant protection by the Fourth 
Amendment under the third-party doctrine). 
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that become pervasive forms of communication and integral to the exercise of 
other rights. It grounds the second prong of the Katz test, better defining what 
expectations of privacy are those that society is willing to accept as reasonable. 
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